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Txosten honek arretaz aztertzen du mugako lurraldeak kontzeptua gaur egun europar gizarteetan
gertatzen ari diren gorabeherei dagokienez, bereziki Europa Batasunaren hedapenaren testuinguruan.
Mugen izaera aldakorra aztertzen da hemen, Mendebalde Ondoko Europa baten nozioaren balioespena
eskaintzearren. Hona txostenean proposatzen den tesia: Europak nazio ondoko forma bat hartu ez ezik,
mendebalde ondoko forma ere hartzen ari da, eta alderdi hori esanguratsuena izan liteke azkenean.
Periferien eta nukleoaren arteko harremanen aldaketa da horren guztiaren alderdi garrantzitsu bat. Muga
berriak moldatzeko eremutzat har daitekeen periferia horretaz beste balioespen bat eskaintzea da txosten
honen asmoa. Periferian barnealdearen eta kanpoaldearen arteko harremana konplexua eta anbibalentea
da; horrek maiz askotan forma baztertzaileak hartzen baditu ere, orobat, negoziazio molde
kosmopolitetarako alortzat har daiteke.
Giltza-hitzak: Europa. Geopolitika. Mugak. Europar Nazioa (Hedapena). Europar Harremana
Zentroaren eta Periferiaren artean. Nazio Nortasunak. Estatu-Nazioa. Kultura Aniztasuna.
El informe explora el concepto de tierras fronterizas con respecto a los acontecimientos que
actualmente se producen en las sociedades europeas, especialmente en el contexto de la reciente
ampliación de la Unión Europea. Se examina la naturaleza cambiante de las fronteras con vistas a
ofrecer una valoración de la noción de una Europa Post Occidental. La tesis que se propone en el
informe es que Europa no sólo está adoptando una forma post nacional, sino también post occidental y
que esta última dimensión puede acabar siendo la más significativa. Un aspecto importante de todo ello
es el cambio de las relaciones de las periferias con el núcleo. El propósito del informe es ofrecer una
nueva valoración de la periferia que puede ser considerada como una zona en la que trazar nuevas
fronteras. En la periferia la relación entre el interior y exterior es compleja y ambivalente; si bien a
menudo adopta formas excluyentes, se trata de una relación que también se puede considerar como
terreno para formas cosmopolitas de negociación.
Palabras clave: Europa. Geopolítica. Fronteras. Nación Europea (Extensión) Relación Europea entre
el Centro y/o la Periferia. Identidades Nacionales. Estado-Nación. Diversidad Cultural.
Le rapport étudie le concept de terres frontalières en ce qui concerne les événements qui se
produisent actuellement au sein des sociétés européennes, spécialement dans le contexte du récent
élargissement de l’Union Européenne. On examine la nature changeante des frontières en vue d’offrir
une évaluation de la notion d’une Europe Post Occidentale. La thèse proposée dans le rapport est que
l’Europe n’adopte pas seulement une forme post nationale, mais également post occidentale et que
cette dernière dimension pourrait être la plus importante. Le changement des relations des périphéries
avec le centre urbain en est l’un des aspects les plus important. Le but du rapport est d’offrir une
nouvelle évaluation de la périphérie qui peut être considérée comme une zone dans laquelle tracer de
nouvelles frontières. La relation entre l’intérieur et l’extérieur dans la périphérie est complexe et
ambivalente ; bien qu’elle adopte souvent des formes exclusives, il s’agit d’une relation qui peut
également être considérée comme terrain de négociation pour des formes cosmopolites.
Mots clés : Europe. Géopolitique. Frontières. Nation Européenne (Extension). Relation Européenne
entre le Centre et ou la Périphérie. Identités Nationales. Etat-Nation. Diversité Culturelle.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The enlargement of the European Union has brought about a significant
change in the shape of Europe as a geopolitical entity. The significance of
the eastern enlargement process goes beyond the institutional question of
the membership and constitution of the EU and suggests a major reorienta-
tion in the identity of Europe. Unlike earlier enlargements of the EU, the
recent enlargement processes have wider cultural implications. The earlier
expansion of the EU in the pre-Cold War period differed in that it was
premised on the certainty offered by the Iron Curtain and while the Treaty of
Rome declared that any European country could join, it was evident that
there were political limits to expansion. It was primarily a western European
inter-state system. Moreover, it was an enlargement that was based on what
was believed to be a common European political heritage. It is certainly the
case that this heritage was often a divisive one and in the case of the south-
ern European countries – Greece, Portugal and Spain – they joined the EU in
the early 1980s only after a prolonged period of military rule. Yet, despite
these caveats, prior to the current enlargement the EU was a fairly cohesive
entity and was able to undergo relative deepening in socio-economic integra-
tion as well as in political integration. The implications of a considerably
enlarged EU have been much discussed as far as integration is concerned,
but what has been given less attention is the implications for the cultural
and political identity of Europe.
One the one side, the EU does not have a political or cultural identity in
any meaningful sense of the term, while on the other side, the identity of
nation-states has been undermined in part as a result both of Europeaniza-
tion and wider processes of globalization. In this context, it is undoubtedly
the case that it has been nation-states who have been the winners, in that
with few, if any, exceptions most member states have benefited from EU
membership and, as far as identity is concerned, national identity is far from
being in demise. But it would be too simple to conclude that in the EU of 27
members – and undoubtedly with more to come – there has been a turn to
national interest and an increase in national identities. The argument
advanced in this paper is that the current situation is more complicated and
that a more accurate account is one that recognizes the modification of
nation-states by Europeanization. Rather than look for a European level of
identity over and beyond national identities or see the latter as resisting a
top-down supranational European identity, attention should be focussed on
the mixed or hybrid nature of national identities, which have been trans-
formed in numerous ways by Europeanization. For this reason the logic of
Europeanization has tended towards the Europeanization of national identi-
ties rather than the demise of national identity. This is evident in many
spheres, in communication, in life styles, and in the many areas in which the
EU has gained legal competences, as in, for instance, education and citizen-
ship (Delanty, 2007).
This paper is concerned with one aspect of the Europeanization of the
nation-state, namely the changing relation of centres and peripheries. This
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will be explored largely around the question of the kinds of borders that are
being created in the periphery as a result of Europeanization. My thesis is
that there is now a changed relation of the periphery to the core, with the
periphery emerging from marginalization to become a site of cosmopolitan
re-bordering. However, the true significance of the relation of core to the
periphery is rather an inter-civilizational one than one that can be seen in
terms of inter-state relations and defined in terms of state-EU dynamics.
2. A POST-WESTERN EUROPE?
My first thesis is that Europe is taking increasingly a post-western shape.
Until now one of the striking features of the European project was the steady
development of a post-national polity whereby the sovereign national state
had to share its sovereignty with other levels of governance, which included
regions and the EU itself. While this remains a feature of contemporary
Europe, there is a more far-reaching development apparent that goes beyond
issues of governance. The reshaping of Europe since the end of communism
and the enlargement of the EU, the prospect of the inclusion of much of the
former Yugoslavia and possibly Turkey’s eventual membership, suggest a
change in the identity of Europe in the direction of a multiple constellation of
regions. This more than a geopolitical shift is also a shift in cultural self-
understanding. Europe today is no longer a western enclave centred around
the core founding states. The earlier EU was largely determined by the cir-
cumstances of its birth in the reconciliation of France and Germany. It was a
Europe centred on the Rhine and the historical territory of the Carolingian
Empire with the Elbe and Danube marking its outer eastern limits. As I
remarked above, the addition of other countries to this did not change the
basic shape of this civilizational current; it was a Europe based on the west-
ern heritage of Latin Christendom,1 the Enlightenment, democracy and the
free-market economy. The western nature of post-war Europe was consolidat-
ed in the twentieth century with the rise of the United States.
What we are witnessing today is the emergence of different civilizational
heritages. These do not so much make redundant or challenge the western
heritage as add to it. The richness of Europe is the richness of its civilization-
al heritages. Until now the dominant approach has been to emphasise the
diversity of Europe in terms of its nations. Indeed, this is the main meaning
of the term “unity in diversity”, which has come to be the principal statement
of its cultural and political identity. This is a unity defined in terms of the
diversity of national cultural and political traditions. A broader view of the
transformation of Europe suggests, I argue, an inter-civilizational perspective
since the shape Europe is now assuming is one that is determined by both
its civilizational context and, related to this, different routes to modernity. An
inter-civilizational perspective, as opposed to a state-centric approach, is
———————————
1. With the exception of Greece (whose claim to the European heritage was not based on
Christianity but classical antiquity).
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suggested by the enlargement of the EU into areas of the continent that have
had different experiences with modernity.2 The case of Central Europe is one
such example of an inter-civilizational heritage, which while being part of the
western European heritage has also been shaped by its proximity to eastern
and western Europe. In the case of East Central Europe – where the empha-
sis shifts to the eastern orientation – this inter-civilizational dimension is
much more significant, for the region has been considerably influenced by
Russia and by the wider Euro-Asian borderland (see Arnason, 2005). The
notion of borderlands, which will be discussed below, is relevant here in the
context of inter-civilizational zones of overlapping identities, heritages, and
experiences of modernity. Of relevance, too, is the emerging identity of what
is increasingly being termed the “Euro-Balkan” region. While the recent
enlargement of the EU has tended to emphasise central and eastern Europe,
the southeastern region is another part of the European civilizational constel-
lation. Much of this region has been influenced by the Ottoman tradition and
thus suggests the relevance of the inter-civilizational dimension, which in this
case is less “eastern” than “southern.” At the present, only Slovenia is a
member of the EU, but this is a complicated case since arguably Slovenia
belongs more to Mitteleuropa than to the Euro-Balkan region (see Vidar and
Delanty, 2008).
While Slovenia might be considered to be somewhere “in-between” Mit-
teleuropa and the Balkans, the case of Romania and Bulgaria are particularly
interesting examples of the inter-civilizational nature of Europe. Unlike the
countries that make up central Europe, in the stricter sense of the term,
Romania and Bulgaria were products of the Eastern Roman Empire and,
especially in Romania, the culture of the Byzantine Empire made its impact
as did the Ottoman tradition and, of course, these countries later fell within
the orbit of Russia. The cultural specificity of these countries is not one that
can be accounted for exclusively in terms of national trajectories. The civiliza-
tional shaping of the modern nation-state is much in evidence in terms of the
model of modernity adopted and in societal structures and identities (Arna-
son, 2003).
From a historical-sociological perspective, the emerging shape of Europe
is perhaps understood as deriving from three basic configurations, which
constitute “three Europes”: a western Europe, a central-eastern Europe, and
a south-eastern Europe. Of these the latter is the most problematic. In a
classic essay, Scüzs (1988) argued that Europe consists of three geopolitical
units, which were formed out of the East-West divide: a western “Carolin-
gian” Europe, Central Eastern Europe, and an Eastern Europe, which has
been closely linked with Russia and has no clear-cut eastern frontier. The
fate of Europe was determined by these three historical regions. There can
be little doubt that it was the first one that was decisive in shaping the Euro-
———————————
2. For a fuller account of a civilizational approach, see Arnason (2003), and with an applica-
tion to Europe, see Delanty (2003) and Delanty and Rumford (2005). See also chapter one in
Byrnes and Katzenstein (2006).
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pean legacy, which Szüzs claimed was characterized by a synthesis of
diverse elements that were assembled out of the prior disintegration of the
older imperial structures. With the partial incorporation of some of the east-
ern region into what might now be called east central Europe, the notion of
an eastern Europe might be redefined to include the southern sphere of
Europe. In any case, it seems incontrovertible that the old East versus West
division of European history must now be modified to one that is more sensi-
tive to the diversity of the central and eastern regions (see also Halecki,
1962; Delanty, 1995). The notion of “three historical” Europes needs to be
redefined to take into account the fact that all three variants included rela-
tions to a wider civilizational area: western Europe includes the wider colo-
nial context; central eastern Europe includes the engagement with Russia
and the wider Slavic dimension; and southeastern Europe includes within it
the Ottoman heritage as well as the Byzantine and Slavic heritages. All three
were shaped by many common strands – the Roman Empire, Judea-Christian-
ity in both its Latin and Greek forms – suggesting a hyphenated notion of civi-
lization as a plural phenomenon.
In emphasizing the civilizational sources of contemporary Europe my aim
is neither to exaggerate these differences nor to suggest that what we have
is some kind of a clash of civilizations. In this respect, I refute the Hunting-
ton thesis that the eastern borders of Europe are zones of civilizational
clashes. The seductiveness of the thesis is in part due to a core of truth in
the argument: the post-1989 world is not exclusively determined by the older
political ideologies, and civilizational factors are playing themselves out in
different ways. The error of the argument is to see civilizational differences
only in terms of conflicts. My argument is rather to see the civilizational
background to contemporary Europe as a source of its diversity and rather
than clashes we can see signs of mutual cooperation. Moreover, Hunting-
ton’s thesis is empirically false in that there is no evidence of civilizational
clashes or conflicts of a cultural nature as far as the enlargement of the EU
is concerned. With the single exception of the Balkans, the integration of
post-1989 Europe – from German unification to post-communist transition, to
the enlargement of the EU – has been remarkably peaceful. The case of eth-
nic cleansing in the Balkans can be seen as a product of the collapse of the
state rather than resulting from a primordial cultural conflict.
Looking at Europe as a whole an unavoidable conclusion is that the
Danube is replacing the Rhine as the symbolical line that marks the centre
of Europe. In addition to this it may also be suggested that the gravity is
shifting from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean Sea in a Europe that is steadi-
ly moving eastwards towards the Black Sea. The new axis is less that of the
Baltic and Adriatic than the Baltic and the Black Sea. The notion of a post-
western Europe is intended to capture the spirit of this movement. Indicated
by the term is a multiple kind of Europe, consisting of many heritages and
experiences with modernity. Some of these are older than the western tradi-
tion and are coming to play a role in the making of Europe today in ways that
cannot be reduced to a simple notion of a clash of cultures. The notion of a
post-western Europe, too, is intended to indicate a reflexive relation in the
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identity of Europe as no longer exclusively determined by the relation with
the United States. This does not mean anti-Americanism, for on the contrary
many central and Eastern European countries – notably Poland the Czech
Republic – are strongly pro-US; rather it points to a more self-problematized
identity and one that does not have the same kind of self-assurance that it
had until about ten years or so ago.
3. THE PERIPHERY CONSIDERED
On the basis of the foregoing argument concerning the emergence of a
post-western Europe in which the inter-civilizational dynamic is an important
but neglected dimension, I would like to clarify the question of the periphery
and its relation to the core. Obviously a periphery can be understood only in
relation to a core. In the case of the European core and peripheries, I am
arguing that the relation of the core to the periphery is multi-dimensional,
evolving and cannot therefore be easily reduced to a one-dimensional notion
of the domination of the periphery by the core. My second thesis is that there
is a general shift to the periphery largely as a result of Europeanization, but
partly as a consequence of globalization. Clearly the core still dominates, if
not the periphery, at least the EU as a whole. The core western countries
– Germany, France, UK – are the largest and most powerful economies in
Europe and among the most powerful in the world, and the terms of EU mem-
bership were not open to much negotiation. Notwithstanding these obvious
objections, the point I am making is not that the periphery is not disadvan-
taged and that it now stands in a relation of equality, but that a more complex
relationship has emerged as far as power and marginality are concerned.
A feature of the eastern enlargement of the EU is the incorporation of
countries that were once on the margins of Europe and many of which had
been in a subordinate status with respect to the major European powers. It
is also noteworthy that many of these are small countries – the Baltic states,
Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Cyprus, Malta – and those
that are territorially relatively large, such as Bulgaria, are in demographic
terms small and traditionally peripheral. Poland, with a population of c. 30
million is an exception, as possibly is Romania with a not insignificant popu-
lation of 22 million, but they too have been traditionally peripheral. Aside
from the question of Turkey, the next wave of accession countries will be
those in the Balkans: Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina. Constituting what
German historians once called an “in-between Europe” (Zwischeneuropa),
these countries experienced marginalization for much of the modern history
of Europe and in many cases where subjugated by the totalitarian states
east and west. Emerging out of this background, participation in the EU
offers many advantages. A longer view of history will place the current trans-
formation of central and eastern Europe in the context of the re-invention of
political modernity.
It is arguably the case that the smaller European countries have benefit-
ed from EU membership. That is certainly the case as far Ireland is con-
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cerned. Since joining in 1973 it has been a major beneficiary. While the rapid
economic growth that Ireland has experienced since the early 1990s has
been due to many factors, EU membership has played a major role in eco-
nomic recovery. Greece and Portugal, although not experiencing the same
economic take-off, have benefited too. It is far too soon to assess the impli-
cations for the recently joined countries, but there is enough evidence to sug-
gest that the triple transition to democracy, market societies and national
autonomy has been relatively successful.3 In the case of German-Polish rela-
tions, while some of the old asymmetries have reappeared, Spohn (2003:
137) has commented that these have crystallized in new forms: the Euro-
peanization of the German economy and Polish economic growth have weak-
ened the older core-periphery dynamic and the older nationalistic forces have
lost their power. Furthermore, the EU itself has been an important lever of
democratization in applicant countries, as is evidenced by the example of the
rapid democratization of Turkey and in recent years Bulgaria and Romania.
In political terms, the EU is now significantly different in that the large
number of small countries have changed the balance of power. This
inevitably leads to a different kind of a relation between the core and periph-
ery. The pre-1989 EU did not experience any challenges from the small coun-
tries of the periphery, represented by Ireland, Greece and Portugal. The
smaller founding countries – Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands –
were relatively prosperous and part of the core. This was also true of Den-
mark and later the Nordic countries. Until the 1990s the EU was largely
shaped by the dynamic of the core countries while today an entirely different
dynamic is emerging. The crisis of the constitutional treaty in 2005 and the
current hiatus is an indication of a growing uncertainty in the political identity
of a union of 27 members, and with the prospect of more to come. The pro-
ject of deepening European integration socio-economically and politically was
premised on a smaller group of countries with similar levels of socio-econom-
ic development. The societies of central and eastern Europe have put the
brakes on deepening, but have not arrested the further development of Euro-
peanization, which is currently re-adjusting to what can be viewed as the
encounter with different models of modernity, some of which, as argued
above, are related to civilizational contexts.
For the first time, the core countries have found themselves challenged
by the encroachment of the periphery. Fears of increased immigration from
central and eastern Europe have been at the forefront of most countries’ pol-
itics and in several cases have led to a reorientation in political support for
the mainstream parties of which the beneficiaries have often been the
extreme right. But in many cases large-scale migration, where it has
occurred, has not resulted in significant challenges. In Ireland, for instance,
the 2006 census reports that there are over 400,000 non-nationals resident
in the country, making migrants about 10 per cent of the population. Polish
immigration is a major part of this. It has been estimated that up to
———————————
3. See Arnason (2005).
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300,000 Poles have migrated to the UK since 2003. It does appear to be
the case that migration into western European countries is relatively stable
and fears of a massive influx of migrants are largely unwarranted. Recent
research suggests that the relatively large-scale Polish migration will not be
repeated when restrictions are lifted against Bulgarian and Rumanian migra-
tion in the first phase after accession. The case of Polish immigration is also
a pertinent example of the reconfiguration of the core and the periphery
around multiple forms of migration. European migration is multi-directional
with migrants moving from East to West on a non-permanent basis. Such
episodic patterns of migration have already made a huge impact on the host
societies as well as on the home countries and constitutes a significant
dimension of Europeanization. Europe is moving to a situation in which the
periphery is already located within the core and where there is no hard, fast
distinction between core and periphery.
With the gradual incorporation of the periphery into the core, the periph-
ery does not disappear. Rather new peripheries emerge. This is already the
case with regard to the division that is now becoming evident between the
countries that have joined the EU and those that remain outside. Although
the older term “Eastern Europe” is now losing its meaning in that it does not
refer to a specific regional entity, the functional equivalent is taking shape
with countries further east – such as Moldova, Belarus and the Ukraine –
and to the south east, such as the Balkan countries.4 Relations between
cores and peripheries are also being redefined through new kinds of power
relations around energy supplies, as the example of gas pipelines illustrates.
Another example is the recent case of the alignment of Poland and the Czech
Republic with the US in allowing the construction of missile defence installa-
tions directed at Russia.
What this suggests is that the core-periphery distinction is no longer the
only model available for understanding marginality and patterns of growth
and change in Europe today. Europeanization and globalization have to an
extent eroded the core-periphery distinction in so far as this was a simple
polarity. Rumford has argued that globalization reshapes the hierarchal
framework within which the core-periphery relation has been constituted
(Rumford, 2002: chapter 7). What has emerged instead is a more complicat-
ed spatial structure and which could be understood in terms of the notion of
a network; a structure that is more polycentric and which entails a basic plu-
ralization of the core-periphery relation. In this sense, then, the older core-
periphery relation is one that was more a feature of the pre-1989 model of
western Europe, while the advent of a post-western Europe signals a differ-
ent spatial dynamic.5
In sum, while it cannot be said that the periphery is now on an equal
footing with the core, the relation has changed to the advantage of the
———————————
4. On the idea of eastern Europe, see Wolff (1994).
5. I am grateful to Chris Rumford for clarifying this point.
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periphery. In this respect one can be reminded of James Joyce’s intention to
Europeanise Hibernia and Hibernicise Europe.6 Taking Ireland as a metaphor
for the periphery, the task has a contemporary relevance in drawing attention
to the need for Europe to find a mutually positive relationship between the
core and the periphery.
4. DIFFERENT KINDS OF DIVERSITIES
A consideration of the nature of European diversity that takes into
account the perspective of the periphery will have to address the reality of
different kinds of diversities. In this respect, the European debate is very dif-
ferent from the North American and Australian debates, which have been
influenced by the language of race and the existence of pre-settler groups
(Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). The European context is different in that the
debate about diversity is not addressed to the problem of indigenous pre-set-
tler groups, but groups formed out of migration or groups created as a result
of nation-state formation. Perhaps for this reason the emphasis in Europe
has been on diversity and ethnicity rather than race.
The dominant understanding of diversity that has emerged with European
integration has been the notion of a “unity in diversity.” This has generally
been understood to be a response to the multi-national nature of Europe and
the fact that Europeanization is not leading to the emergence of an overarch-
ing identity that would be a focus for unity. The trend has been towards the
recognition of the diversity of Europe. While from the perspective of the EU
this diversity is in the first instance national, a fuller analysis reveals a more
complex picture.
The previous discussion has emphasized the inter-civilizational diversity
of Europe in terms of a constellation of at least three different regional vari-
ants: the western, the central and eastern/southern. This perspective can be
furthermore related to the debate on multiple modernities in relation to
Europe (Blokker, 2005; Delanty, 2003a). In this regard, the emphasis shifts
to varieties of modernity rather than, for instance, a simplistic notion of a sin-
gle, western version of modernity replacing a notion of tradition or the claim
that postcommunist countries are simply catching up on the west (Haber-
mas, 1990).7 As Roudometof (1999) has argued in the case of south-east-
ern Europe, what is often regarded as a recalcitrant tradition was in fact an
experiment with modernity that went wrong. His argument is that the actual
or potential conflicts in the Balkan region were the result of rivalries created
by the region’s re-organization according to western models of modernity and
not due to a primordial clash of civilizations. In a similar way, Blokker (2002)
———————————
6. Hibernia was the Latin name for Ireland. On Ireland and Europe, see McCall and Wilson
(2008 forthcoming).
7. See Outwaite and Ray (2006, in particular chapter 5) for a discussion on social theory
and modernity with respect to post-communism.
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has argued that rather than understand accession and convergence as the
logical outcome of the transition to post-communism, where the accession
countries shed their “non-Europeaness” and become normal, the widening of
the EU should be seen as increasing the diversity of Europe. Moreover, as
argued above, the inclusion of central and eastern European countries in the
EU allows those countries to articulate different interests and perspectives.
This is not only a matter of different models of modernity, but also different
combinations of premodernity with modernity. Outhwaite and Ray (2006:
114-5) argue in this vein that the outcome of the implosion of communism
was a combination of local traditions and practices with new developments
rather than a simple adoption of westernization. In this sense, then, the
enlargement of the EU increases diversity rather than diminishing it.
A broader view of European diversity, I have argued, must go beyond a
focus on nations in relation to the EU. The civilizational approach I have
sketched suggests a broader conception of European diversity than one
reducible to nations. This suggests a view of modernity itself as multiple and
the source of the diversity of Europe. If this is correct, then, we can expect
increased political diversity. But what of cultural diversity beyond and below
the level of nations? Here we move closer to the sphere of multiculturalism.
Any account of European diversity will have to address the problem of differ-
ent understandings of cultural diversity in the various parts of Europe. This is
unavoidably linked to different experiences with minorities and with migration.
In Europe migrants comprise 4.5 per cent of the total population and in
many countries they are the main factor in population increase. There are
about 24.6 million recorded foreign nationals in European countries.8 About
83 million people in Europe who were born in countries other than the ones in
which they reside. There are about 10 million foreign workers currently regis-
tered in those European states. This figure obviously does not include a large
number of illegal migrants. However, estimates differ. One view is that the
wider European Economic Area hosts some 56.1 million migrants, circa 3
migrants to 1000 inhabitants.9 This of course includes only migrants, persons
born outside the country in which they are resident. It does not include ethnic
communities with large numbers of permanent residents including those who
have acquired the nationality of the country of their birth.
A new understanding of diversity is emerging in which the concern with
diversity is excluding recognition of minorities. Kevin Robbins (2006) has
argued that there has been a discursive shift in Europe generally whereby the
language of “minorities” has been replaced by a new emphasis on diversity
(see also Bennett, 2001; Ellmeier and Rasky, 2006). To an extent, as he
notes, this is positive in that the equation of “otherness” with minorities is
reduced and a more generalizable notion of diversity relevant to the vast
———————————
8. This figures and other cited here are derived from Salt (2005). 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/social_cohesion/population/EPC(2005)K3.0%20Salt%20keynote.doc.
9. Boswell (2005) Migration http://www.gcim.org/attachements/RS4.pdf.
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range of social and cultural differences can be more readily applied. As Rob-
bins points out, the notion of diversity normalizes difference and facilitates a
broadening of the horizons beyond ethnic categorization, working towards the
“de-ethnicization of difference” and invoking a more positive understanding
of difference. However, the centrality of “diversity” today is not unproblematic
since it is being predominantly being interpreted in much of central and east-
ern Europe as a way to relate to national autochthonous minorities. What
had begun as an attempt to replace the language of minority/majority culture
to take account of a wider range of diversities, is in danger of being reduced
to ethnic categories. In the discursive shift, what is lost is recognition of
forms of diversity that are not related to national minorities.
The main difference is that western experiences are based on postcolo-
nial immigration while in central and eastern European the main interest is in
autochthonous minorities. As Robbins (2006) and Ellmeier and Rasky (2006)
argue, in central and eastern Europe the language of diversity is borrowed
from the western European experience, which has been heavily influenced by
diasporic migration from former colonies, and is being applied to national
minorities – so-called autochthonous groups. In the former case, diversity is
predominantly postcolonial and diasporic and has been the basis of much of
multiculturalism in Britain, Belgium, Netherlands and France. A second wave
of migration in western Europe can also be identified which has had wider
sphere of relevance. This can be related to an intra-European migration from
the south to the north in the 1970s which most western/northern European
countries experienced and which has been decisive in shaping the transition
to multiculturalism in those countries. To this can be added the current wave
of migration from East to West that had followed in the aftermath of the
enlargement of the EU, a wave of migration that coincided with an increase in
asylum seekers and refugees.
While western Europe has had a relatively long experience with cultural
diversity, the situation in central and eastern Europe is less straightforward.
On the one side, it can be argued that the legacy of history has been one of
greater cultural and political diversity and that this has never been success-
fully accommodated within the structures of the nation-state. This is an diver-
sity that is primarily based on autochthonous minorities that have been in
different ways associated with the former multi-ethnic empires (Habsburg,
Ottoman, Russian) out of which the modern nation-states were created. The
cultural heterogeneity of the old empires is to be found at the level of cross-
national cultures and other kinds of overlapping affiliations. Although too a
feature of western Europe, it is a more pronounced feature of the cultural
landscape of central and eastern Europe.
On the other side, in central and eastern Europe the experience with
diasporic minorities formed as a result of migration from outside Europe is
limited and consequently cultural diversity policies are generally aimed at
autochthonous minorities to the relative neglect of other kinds of minorities.
This is to the disadvantage of non-ethnic minorities such as refugees and
asylum seekers. In addition, in the former communist countries there is the
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emergence on “new minorities”, i.e. as former majorities, or relatively large
ethnic groups, become minorities (e.g. Russians in Latvia or Serbs in Croat-
ia). As Ellmeier and Rasky (2006: 29-33) point out, cultural policy in many
cases is connected with nation-building exercises and there is a general
interest in maintaining the old minorities as the crucial points of diversity
and identity politics.
What we have here are two different conceptions of diversity: one that is
primarily based on multiculturalism and the rights of citizenship and one that
is more ethnopluralist and is generally directly concerned with regional and
ethnic autonomy. It is not clear how the current notion of diversity, con-
strained as it is by national borders, is able to suggest a way forward. So my
third thesis is that central and eastern Europe has a long way to go in linking
citizenship with diversity, while on the other side Europe as a whole will need
to move beyond the currently bifurcated conception of diversity.
The problem of ethnopluralism has a direct bearing on the question of
borders since much of the problem is due to fact that many national minori-
ties are linked to a majority population group in a neighbouring countries. A
pertinent example of this is Romania, where the Hungarian minority, which
represents 6.6 per cent of the population, is concentrated in locations on
the Hungarian border and in parts of Transylvania (where it is as much as 30
per cent of the population). Aside from very small minorities related to neigh-
bouring countries, the other minority, the Roma, who constitute 2.2 per cent,
did not have any minority status until 1990 (Ellmeier and Rasky, 2006: 61),
and as a transnational or transcultural group they do not fall into the catego-
ry of autochthonous minorities and as a result are disadvantaged.
5. RE-INTERPRETING THE BORDER: COSMOPOLITAN ORIENTATIONS
The border has long marked the rise of modernity and the geopolitical
system of nation-states that is brought into existence. Although these units
are still with us, they have been considerably diminished, at least within
Europe, in so far as they are defined with respect to their borders. Borders
are no longer dividing lines akin to the traditional notion of a frontier in the
sense of a line demarcating one state from another; they have become con-
siderably weakened and are more diffuse, often sites of overlapping commu-
nities and regions. This is also the case with respect to the external relation
of Europe to the wider world. The border is a networked and fluid process
rather than a fixed line and is constituted in new and changing relations
between cores and peripheries. Europeanization has neither eliminated bor-
ders nor created a new external frontier. New kinds of borders are taking
shape in the European space.10 The present contours of the EU do not
amount to a final frontier. The European external border is not a clear-cut
line of demarcation that is capable of dividing an inside from an outside.
———————————
10. See Delanty (2006) for an extended discussion of this point.
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There is no point at which an Iron Curtain is reached. The EU’s system of
governance now extends beyond EU space to the wider south and entails
relations that cannot be understood in the traditional terms of a closed
frontier. Europe’s borders, both internal and external, are shaped not just by
the logic of Europeanization, but by the interaction with the global context.
The global, the national and the European dimensions interact to produce a
complex field of borders and rebordering out of which emerges a post-west-
ern constellation.
It may be contended that the southern frontier is coming into existence
and replacing the East-West divide. This North-South border, with its focus on
the Euro-Mediterranean area, has certainly become more salient (Suarez-
Navaz, 2004), but it is not a straightforward replacement of the older East-
West border. Although the EU is not l ikely to expand across the
Mediterranean Sea in the way it has into eastern Europe, the Euro-Mediter-
ranean region has become an unavoidable part of the wider European area.
It is principally represented with the present configuration by Malta. However,
despite the various partnerships, the present structures of the EU do not
adequately accommodate this region, which has also been somewhat mar-
ginalized as a result of the eastern enlargement and has too become a focus
of new security concerns.
Notwithstanding these qualifications around the ambivalence of internal
and external borders, I would like to conclude with the final thesis that there
are grounds for optimism in that there are some interesting examples of the
border becoming a site of cosmopolitan reorientations in previously divided
identities. It is in this respect that Europe as a whole can learn from the
experience of the periphery in coming to terms with conflict and with differ-
ence. The relevant examples that can be cited are changing cross-border
relations in South Tyrol, Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Hungarian-Romanian bor-
der area, and Polish-Lithuanian cross-border co-operation, to mention just a
few examples. In such cases where there are contested borders, different
and conflicting collective memories, minority rights relating to religion, lan-
guage and political representation, considerable progress has been made in
moving towards reconciliation and the negotiation of conflict.11 Other and dif-
ferent examples can also be found, such as cross-country anti-human traf-
ficking measures. An overall view is difficult but it might be suggested that
the cultural logic of Europeanization has brought a decrease in border con-
flicts and a general move in the direction of more cosmopolitan orientations
(see Delanty and Rumford, 2005). A cosmopolitan interpretation of such
developments suggests the relevance of a consideration of Europe in terms
of a borderland (see Balibar, 2004: 219). The significance of the notion of
the borderland is that it captures much of the reality of European borders,
where inside and outside are not easily separated and where the border is
being reconstituted in numerous ways.12 Moreover, the notion of the border-
———————————
11. See Anderson et al (2003), Meinhof (2002).
12. For a further account of borders and borderlands, see Rumford (2006).
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land invokes the move towards a network conception of space, which I have
argued is relevant to the current dynamic of Europeanization and its interface
with globalization.
In sum, the border is not just a conflict zone where a primordial clash of
civilizations is played out. The border takes many different forms and
includes sites of negotiation, which are illustrated by some of the examples
referred to above. In such cases, the periphery has moved beyond the limits
of border thinking and the simple polarities of self versus other are losing
their force.
6. CONCLUSION
Fifty years ago, with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, the European project
commenced as a project to integrate the two major core states of the Euro-
pean continent, France and Germany. This venture has been successful and
in more recent times, since the end of communism, a new era has begun in
which the focus has shifted to the periphery and to its relation with the core.
The new challenges are those of a much more complicated world of diversi-
ties and the negotiation of borders and, especially in the case of central and
eastern Europe, of conflict resolution between communities divided as a
result of the legacy of nation-state building. The simple appeal to Europe’s
diversity will not be enough since many of the problems to which diversity is
intended to be a solution are produced by the very national models that are
regarded as the carriers of diversity. A step in the right direction would be an
inter-cultural dialogue of the different European understandings of diversity
and to explore ways of reconciling the divergent western, central, and eastern
approaches to cultural diversity.
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